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INTRODUCTION

In assessing the scope of religious rights versus other people's rights there is one
important attribute of religion that is frequently unrealized or forgotten. And that is
the ubiquity of religion. For example, unlike speech which can only be expressed
verbally, symbolically, or in print; religion can be manifested in an almost unlimited
number of ways.
Let me illustrate with a couple of actual cases. The first, Bowen v. Roy, involved
the father of a newly born child who believed that her soul would be destroyed if she
were assigned a social security number, or if he were required to use it.
2 Surely, this is in the category of who would have believed it if it hadn't
happened. One could just as easily believe that his soul could be destroyed if his
military or tax records were kept in computers, in green file cabinets, or for that
matter on paper. It's even more plausible to believe that some religion could teach
that paying taxes is sinful or that the Lord commands one to steal for the good of
the church. After all, belief in the Ten Commandments is not a necessary predicate
to a religion counting as a religion.
Well, Bowen v. Roy, in a manner of speaking (excuse the expression), split the
baby. It held that a person's religion could not control how the government runs its
operations. 3 Thus, the government could assign Little Bird of the Snow (Roy's baby)
a social security number, but it could not require Roy to use it in his dealings with
the government, thereby violating Roy's religious objections.
I think that this is a good template to begin analysis. To be sure, from Roy's
perspective, just allowing him to not use the social security number will not save
Little Bird of the Snow's soul. But that is the way it is when one lives in an ordered
society. Of course, from the government's perspective, there is inconvenience
involved in trying to process his claims without the benefit of a social security
number. Nevertheless, the Court thought that this was a reasonable accommodation
to be made towards religion.
Lyng v. NorthwestIndian Cem eteryProtectiveAss'n,on the other hand, rejected
such an accommodation.' There, members of the Native American Church believed
that if the Government built a road, on land that the Government owned, the land
in the form that the Native Americans held sacred would be destroyed.' Of course,
the strong form of that argument cannot prevail. For example, if the Federal
Government wanted to build a new wing onto the White House and somebody said:
"You cannot do that, I worship the White House just the way it is," the Government
would prevail.

See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986).
Id. at 699-700.
See id. at 700-03, 706-09.
Seeid. 709-11.
6 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453, 458 (1988).
' See id. at 442-43.
2
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But the Lyng plaintiffs argued for a less absolute right than that. They argued
that, given the strength of their religious claim and the Government's lack of any real
necessity to build the road, their claim should prevail.' The Court, in my view quite
correctly, rejected that claim. It took the position that the Government's right to
develop its own land was absolute, and that there was no requirement that the Court
balance the religious value of the land to non-owners against the government/owner's
rights to use the land as it saw fit.'
I. MULTI-FACETED ANTI-RELIGIOUS INTEREST
Another issue that makes religion cases tough and one reason that we are here is
that, in addition to the usual government interests, there is the concern that some
person or entity would like to engage in the same practice as a religious person or
entity but cannot because it has no religious reason for doing so. For example, in
HobbyLobby,' 0 though not mentioned in the opinion, it is entirely possible that one
of Hobby Lobby's competitors, say Michael's would like to be relieved of some of its
insurance requirements. Obviously, if Michael's has to pay for its employee's
contraceptive health care and Hobby Lobby does not, to some extent, that puts
Hobby Lobby at a competitive advantage." Yet the Court did not even seem
concerned enough to discuss the point.
The Court has not always been so oblivious. For example, in United States v.
Lee, the Court, albeit somewhat opaquely, recognized the competitive advantage
that exempting an Amish employer from paying his employee's social security taxes
would give that employer vis-a-vis others who were forced to pay social security
taxes.1 2 The question in each case should be if the religious exemption is given, what
impact would that have on similar people who would like a similar exemption, but
do not have a religious claim to back it up.
One thing seems certain, the government should not adopt policies which might
encourage somebody to adopt (or pretend to adopt) a religion that might give them
a secular benefit. Leewas a good example of that and HobbyLobbymay or may not
have been, depending on the dollar savings Hobby Lobby enjoyed by virtue of its
reduced contraceptive insurance payments.
One case in which this problem was minimal was Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3 There
the Court held that Amish children were entitled to a religious exemption from
Wisconsin's compulsory education law.' 4 Of course, it is possible that somewhere in
Wisconsin, some farmer might say: "Gee, I wish my 14-year-old could stay home

See id. at 444-45.
Id. at 453, 457-58.
' 0 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
See id. at 2785 (holding that the application of the contraceptive mandate to closely held
corporations, like Hobby Lobby, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
12 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1982).
13 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14 Id. at 234.
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from school and help out on the farm, I think that I will become Amish and make
that happen." Although that is a theoretical possibility, I think that the likelihood of
that happening in large enough numbers that we should worry about it is extremely
small. So, at least on that issue, I think that Yoderwas correctly decided.
Well, how would the defendant in Emploment Division v Smith'" have fared
under this test? I think that the answer depends on how broadly or narrowly one
defines Smith's claim. If one defines his claim as the right to use illegal drugs,'6 there
are many people out there who want that right. Consequently, recognition of the
right could well encourage people to join churches that champion the right to use
illegal drugs, such as marijuana.'
On the other hand, if Smith's claim is defined more narrowly (i.e. the right to
use a particularly bitter and ill-tasting drug under highly controlled circumstances),
the number of adherents would be considerably less. In my view, this is the correct
way to analyze the case.'" I simply cannot imagine a large number of people who are
not already religious adherents who would want to go out in a deserted field, far from
civilization, bring their non-ingesting family with them, and be cared for until they
sobered up. So, on that issue, I think that Smith should have won.
Ironically, I do believe that the Court reached the correct result in Smith, albeit
for the wrong reasons. Whatever one might think of the unemployment
compensation cases, at least those workers had no religious reason that precluded
their working when they were hired." Smith and Black, on the other hand, knew
from the day that they were hired that their religion precluded them from being drug
free, a criterion for the job of drug rehabilitation counselor for which they were
hired.20 It is as if an Orthodox Jew or Muslim applied for a job in a sausage tasting
factory and was fired for not tasting sausage. Surely such a person would not be
entitled to unemployment compensation.

A. Harm to Those Who Would Be Helpedbut for a Religious Exemption
This brings us to the issue of harm caused to intended beneficiaries of a statute
who may be denied that benefit because of a claimed religious right, basically the
reason for this conference. Since we are in Kentucky, let's begin with the case of Kim
Davis, a municipal clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses to homosexual
couples after Obergefell.2' Unlike some other cases of discrimination against one

's

Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

16 See id. at 874-76.
"

See Town v. State ex ref Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 649, 651 (Fla. 1979) (finding a compelling

governmental interest in restricting marijuana usage).
"s See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking FreeExercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne: Chartinga

Middle Course, 68 MISS. LJ. 105, 146 (1998).
1 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963).
20 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
21 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015), appeal
dismissed, case
remanded, 667 F. App'x 537 (6th Cir. 2016); see alsoObergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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with a protected characteristic such as race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, in
this case, it is imperative that the Clerk's office issue a marriage license because the
constitutional right cannot be accomplished without one. 22 Thus, it is critical that
Ms. Davis or one of her underlings issue the marriage license.
But she contends that the God she worships forbids her sanctioning such
marriages. Of course, the short, and were it not for the presence of a reasonable
alternative, complete answer is that if she can't be true to both the commands of God
(her creator) and Caesar (her employer), she must resign her position with Caesar so
that she can be true to her idea of the Lord's commands. Obviously, we cannot allow
her to follow God's commands and thereby deny others the rights assured them by
the United States Constitution.
Fortunately for Ms. Davis, there was an alternative. The court order did not
require Ms. Davis to personally issue the marriage licenses, only that somebody in
her office do so. 24 Of course Ms. Davis claimed that she couldn't order anyone else
in her office to disobey God's Commandments. 25 Fortunately, she did not have to.
The court did it for her. 26 Thus, Ms. Davis was able to keep both her job and her
duty to God as she saw it, and at the same time, the same sex couples seeking a
marriage license were able to obtain one.
Of course, not all cases are as easily resolved as this one. If they were, there would
be no need for this conference. Take for example what happened in the 1960s when
the Supreme Court ordered all restaurants to be integrated. 27 Suppose that John and
Mary Jones run a literal Mom and Pop burger restaurant, which they name LBB,
which stands for Lexington's Best Burgers. Suppose further that they sincerely
believe that God commands separation of the races. In accordance therewith, LBB
refuses to serve African Americans except at the drive through window. The
restaurant is ultimately sued under the Federal Civil Rights Act 28 and interjects the
Free Exercise Clause 29 in defense.
Suppose the discriminated against customer, Ida Mae Johnson, claims that she is
denied service exclusively because of the color of her skin. The Joneses claim first
that she can still get an LBB burger if she uses the drive-in window. Additionally,
they claim that she can get a burger at a sit-down restaurant if she goes to the local
McDonald's or Wendy's. To which Ms. Johnson says: "That is not good enough. I
want one of Lexington's Best Burgers and I want to sit down when I eat it. The law
entitles me to that much."
Well, how should the Court decide this case? Although the Supreme Court has
no exact precedent on point, it did hold in the Bob Jones case that an educational
Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 935.
Id. at 932.
24 See id. at 932, 944.
25 Id. at 932.
26 See id. at 944.
27 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05
(1964).
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447
29 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22
23
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institution's religious principles that includes racial discrimination did not entitle it
to both free exercise of religion and a tax exemption.30 I believe that the law for the
real Bob Jones University also ought to be the law for the hypothetical John and
Mary Jones.
If the free exercise claim were to prevail, both forms of victims previously
discussed would be affected. Obviously, Ms. Johnson is hurt even if, by objective
measurement, McDonald's and Wendy's hamburgers were just as good. The law says
that she is entitled to be served at LBB if that is where she wants to eat. Furthermore,
assuming that Lexington is like most communities that once practiced segregation,
giving LBB a religious exemption would discriminate against McDonald's and
Wendy's. Even in more modern times, it is possible that most of the white
population would prefer to eat at a segregated restaurant.3 ' Thus, at least some of
McDonald's and Wendy's customers might have chosen to eat at LBB, not because
they liked the food better, but because it is the only place they could eat their burgers
in what they considered segregated splendor.
The same scenario can occur in property management. Suppose that Joe works
for a property management company. Suppose further, he believes that God
commands that only heterosexual married couples should live together. Then
suppose that Bill and Megan, an unmarried couple, living together, apply to rent one
of the twenty-five apartments that he manages. Joe tells them that, as a God-fearing
man, he will not show or rent them an apartment, but that there are three other
property managers in town that are not so God-fearing and they may be able to rent
from one of them. He then tells the same thing to Mark and David, a married
same-sex couple.
How should the law suits against Joe be decided? Well, unlike LBB, Joe is not
gaining a competitive advantage vis-a-vis the other property managers. They are only
too happy to take the business that he doesn't want. But, the discrimination against
Bill, Megan, Mark, and David is palpable: apartments are not fungible. Indeed, they
are less fungible than hamburgers. Joe may have a beautiful fourteenth-floor
apartment overlooking a river that the other property managers do not. So, how do
Joe's rights measure up to those of his disappointed tenants?
It seems to me that Joe should lose. A property manager is very nearly analogous
to a public utility: there is simply no room for discrimination.32 Interestingly, many
states carve out an exemption for small landlords, i.e. those who live in one unit of a
four unit or smaller complex.33 I think that this sort of legislative compromise is
entirely appropriate. What stands out in such an exemption is the essential

30
31

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ky. 2004), as

modified (Nov. 23, 2004) (showing that segregation in Lexington is so endemic that it still preserves in
modern times).
32 See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77, 280, 284 (Alaska
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994).
33 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-8-7 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4607(e) (West 2017); GA.

CODE ANN.

§ 8-3-202(b)(1)

(West 2017).
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irrelevance of religion. That is, a person who wants to choose to live with "his own
kind" is free to do so whether his reasons are religious, racial, or a shared interest in
sports. If a state does not have such an exemption, the free exercise question is surely
closer. It is one thing to tell a commercial landlord that if he cannot serve God
without unlawful discrimination he needs to find another line of work. It is quite
something else to tell a man who lives in one of a small number of units that he
cannot choose who his neighbors will be.34
II. RECENT AND PENDING CASES

Let's now turn to a recent case, HobbyLobby,35 and a pending case, Masterpiece
Cake Shop.3 6 First, Hobby Lobby. To begin with, Hobby Lobby was not a free
exercise case, it was a RFRA case. 37 The difference is significant. Unless the Court
were prepared to undo Justice Scalia's handiwork in Smith,38 Hobby Lobby would
have no chance of winning on free exercise grounds. This is because every entity
lacking a religion-based claim would have to pay for its employees' contraceptive
health care. And, under Smith, so long as religious entities are not required to do
anything because of their religiosity, adhering to religiously neutral laws does not
violate their free exercise of religion.3 9
But, RFRA is a different story. Although constitutionally inapplicable to state
cases, 40 RFRA does apply to Federal statutes like the Affordable Care Act (also known
as Obamacare). 4 1 Under RFRA, the Government cannot substantially interfere with a
religious practice unless it has a compelling interest to do so and acts in the least restrictive
42
manner possible.
So, there are three potential issues in HobbyLobby (1) Is there a substantial burden
on religion? (2) Does the government have a compelling interest? And (3) If so, was that
compelling interest met by the least restrictive means?4 3 Interestingly, in measuring the
burden on religion, the Court employed the penalty for not making the payments rather
than the cost of the payments themselves.44 Unsurprisingly, this greatly increased the

34

For an illustration of the problem, see, for example, Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 913

P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
35 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
36 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738,
2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub non. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
37 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C. (2012)).
31 See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
39 See id. at 879.
41

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997).
See, e.g., HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762, 2766.

42

CityfBoerne, 521

43

See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
See id. at 2775-77.

44

U.S. at 529.
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cost. 45 But that is like measuring the cost in Lee on the penalty for not paying Social
Security rather than the cost of the Social Security payments themselves.46
In my view, the cost of making a payment should never count as a substantial burden
on religion, regardless of what one thinks God has to say about the morality of the
expenditure after payment. Certainly, that seemed to be the Court's view in Lee,4' and I
am aware of no case, pre- or post-Smith, where a deific command to not pay certain taxes
was ever deemed to be a substantial burden. Indeed, in Hobby Lobby the Court seemed
to agree that that was true of taxes, but that insurance payments were somehow
different. 48 It certainly was never clear to me how they were different or by what logic
they were thought to be.
Interestingly, the one part of the test that Hobby Lobby might have won, the
Court presumed against them and that was compelling government interest. 49 Given
the number of exceptions already on the books and the amount of contraception care
that Hobby Lobby was already paying, one could argue that the government's
interest in covering the remaining types of contraception was not compelling.5 0
Nevertheless, so it could get to the least restrictive means test, the Court assumed a
compelling government interest.5
Frankly, on that part of its opinion, the Court went off the rails in a way unlike
anything that I can ever recalling seeing. The Court said:
The most straightforward way of doing this [-providing contraceptive
care not provided by Hobby Lobby-] would be for the Government to
assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women
who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due
to their employers' religious objections.52
No matter how many times I read that statement, I just can't believe that the
Court actually said it, but it did. By that reasoning, a corporation owned by
individuals with serious religious beliefs opposed to a particular expenditure would
never have to pay for contraceptives because there would always be another way to
finance it, i.e. somebody else's taxes. That cannot be the law, and indeed it is not,
outside of this very narrow area of insurance payments. Now, the Court will most
likely artificially distinguish tax cases, which would not have been necessary had it
not so thoroughly messed up Hobby Lobby

45
46

See id. at 2775-76, 2779.
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982).

47 See id. at 258-61.
41
49

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783-84 (2014).
Id. at 2779-80.

so See id.
s' See id.
52

Id. at 2780.
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The final case that I want to discuss is this term's Masterpiece Cake Shop case.53
In this case, a same sex couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins asked Jack Phillips,
the owner of Masterpiece Cake Shop, to bake them a wedding cake. 54 He refused on
the ground of his religiously-motivated opposition to same-sex weddings." The
Supreme Court has agreed to hear two issues in the case: (1) whether the Free
Exercise Clause protects Mr. Phillips right to not bake the cake, and (2) whether the
Free Speech Clause protects Mr. Phillips from having to make an artistic creation
contrary to a position (opposition to same-sex marriage) that he wants to take."
I think that unless Smith is overruled or distinguished in a totally artificial way,
Phillips and Masterpiece have to lose their free exercise claim. To the extent that
there is a difference between the practice of Smith and Phillips, it actually favors
protecting Smith. Smith did not hurt anybody by his peyote use in a lonely field
surrounded by non-smoking family members." Phillips, on the other hand, harmed
Charlie and Dave by refusing to bake them a cake for the most significant day of
their lives.
I concede that Phillips's case is not as clear cut as that of Kim Davis. Her refusal
58
to issue a marriage license totally precluded the marriage of people in her county.
Charlie and Dave could find somebody else to bake their cake and they could have a
wonderful wedding and live happily ever after.
Nevertheless, unless Smith is overruled, there is no way that Phillips can win on
free exercise grounds. And, of course, unlike HobbyLobby this case is not muddied
by RFRA because the Federal Statute does not apply to the states 59 and Colorado
does not have its own RFRA.60 Rather, Colorado believes that all of its public bakers
must be open to all.
Although one can never be sure, I think it is unlikely that Smith will be overruled.
For one thing, I think that respect for Scalia, especially from the conservative bloc,
makes overruling unlikely. Second, given last term's Trinity Church case, which
exalted neutrality to new heights in the context of the Establishment Clause,' I think
that the Court is unlikely to go against neutrality in the context of free exercise.
This does not necessarily mean that Phillips and Masterpiece will lose. They do
have a legitimate free speech claim. My best guess is (and I say that with no sense of
certitude) is that the Court may say that this question is not ripe for adjudication.

5 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738,
2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub non. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
5 Craig, 370 P.3d at 276.

55 Id.
56 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,

No. 16-111 (U.S. July 22, 2016).
* See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
s See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
5 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
6o
61

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 289 n.12.
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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That is because Craig and Mullins never said what they wanted on their cake.62 It is
plausible that they would have been happy with a plain cake with no writings or
figurines or that they would have put the writings and/or figurines on themselves, if
that is so, Phillips's free speech claim would be much weaker. My guess is that the
Court will prefer a more complete record of what was going to go on the cake before
resolving the free speech claim. But like I said, I could be wrong on this one.
CONCLUSION

Finally, one question that has hovered over these cases, especially Hobby Lobby
is whether corporations should have free exercise of religion rights. Although I think
that they were badly misused in Hobby Lobby I do think that corporations should
have such rights. I certainly think that the Court was correct to have heard Crown
Kosher Supermarket's challenge to the Sunday Closing Laws back in the sixties.63
Let me give an example where I think a corporation should win. Suppose a
particular community passed an ordinance requiring all fast food restaurants to be
open on Sunday. Suppose further that Chick-fil-A's owners pretty much share the
religious views of Hobby Lobby's owners and refuse to open on Sunday. Finally,
suppose that Chick-fil-A's owners are prosecuted for not opening. Given the balance
of equities, I think that Chick-fil-A's owners should win their case. I realize that
such a result would require a tweaking of Smith,64 but, frankly, it is a relatively minor
tweaking, akin to allowing ceremonial wine at a religious function,65 which I would
support.
So, with that, I will sit down and thank the organizers of this symposium for the
opportunity to express some views on this very important subject.66

62 Masterpiecc Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 276.
63

See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1961).

64 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
65

See Arnold H. Loewy, Rejecting Both Smith and RFRA, 44 TEX. TECH L. REv. 231, 232-33

(2011).
66 Subsequent to the writing of this article, the Supreme Court decided the Masterpiece
Cakeshop
in favor of the baker and against the same -sexed couple. The Court's rationale relied heavily on the fact
that the marriage of Craig and Mullins was neither constitutionally protected nor lawful in Colorado at
the time that the celebratory cake was ordered. Therefore, the Court thought that Masterpiece's claim
outweighed the claim of the same-sexed couple. The decision, somewhat like my proposed solution of
finding against Masterpiece on ripeness grounds has the effect of being good for this case and this case
only because when the next case arises, same sex marriages will not only be lawful, but constitutionally
protected.

